We introduce the …nancial market friction through the search and matching in the loan market into a standard New Keynesian model. We reveal that the second order approximation of social welfare includes the terms relating credit, such as credit market tightness, the volume of credit, and a loan separation rate, in addition to the in ‡ation rate and the consumption under the …nancial market friction. Our analytical result justi…es the reason why the optimal policy should take the credit variation into account. We introduce a monetary policy and macroprudential policy measures for the …nancial stability into the model. The optimal outcome is achieved through the monetary and macroprudential policies by taking into account not only price stability but also …nancial stability.
Introduction
Financial crises reveal critical roles of …nancial markets by inducing real economic disruptions. Under such a situation, accompanied with a lack of room of the monetary policy, policy makers shed light on the policy measures including macroprudential policy for …-nancial stability as a new frontier of the macro policy.
Some empirical and theoretical studies clarify the need of policy measures for …nancial stability. Borio (2011) empirically shows a di¤erence between …nancial cycles and business cycles and then justi…es necessity of coexistence of the monetary policy and the macroprudential policy. 1 Quantitative studies for optimal policy under well-known models with …nancial frictions have started to be conducted. For example, Quint and Rabanal (2011) assume the DSGE model with real, nominal and …nancial frictions, and study the optimal combination of the monetary and macroprudential policies. They show that a social welfare improves when the policy maker's objective function includes the credit term, implying that the macroprudential policies are quantitatively important. Similar approach is taken by Suh (2012) and Kannan, Rabanal, and Scott (2012) under some di¤erence in DSGE models. Suh (2012) shows that the macroprudential policy should respond to credit to improve a social welfare apart from the monetary policy responses to the output gap and the in ‡ation rate. Kannan, Rabanal, and Scott (2012) show that the monetary policy reaction to credit growth can help macroeconomic stabilization. These positive analyses, however, do not provide the answers for why counting the credit into the policy can improve welfare.
In this paper, we aim to reveal a criteria for optimal policy under a …nancial market friction. Our focus is on a normative analysis rather than a positive analysis. To introduce a …nancial friction into a standard New Keynesian model, we assume search and matching in the loan m arket, following Wasmer and Weil (2000) and Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2003) . 234 Based on the model, we approximate the consumer's welfare function in the second order and reveal the property of the optimal policy for …nancial stability. A new …nding is that approximated welfare function includes a term closely related to the volume of credit in addition to the in ‡ation rate and consumption. This result theoretically justi…es necessity of …nancial stability for optimal policy. Then, we introduce a monetary policy and macroprudential policy. The macroprudential policy aims to achieve …nancial stability.
We show that optimal policy outcomes change according to the type of macroprudential policies. When the degree of competition in the loan market through Nash bargaining is endogenized and the macroprudential policy, which is interpreted as a type of a …nancial regulation policy, intervenes in such a competition, the optimal macroprudential policy perfectly stabilizes the in ‡ation rate to a cost-push shock accompanied with the monetary policy. This is because the macroprudential policy contributes to price stability through the cost channel. When a macroprudential policy intervenes in a endogenous credit separation, this macroprudential policy can be interpreted as a total lending control. In this case, a welfare function additionally includes terms for credit separation and the optimal macroprudential policy adjusts the separation rate by taking into account trade-o¤ among the separation rate, credit market tightness, the in ‡ation rate, and consumption. In any case, the macroprudential policy for …nancial stability have a close relation with price stability and consequently with the monetary policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section sets up a model.
In Section 3, we derive the second order approximation from the consumer's utility function and comment on its properties. In Section 4, we show the linearized system of the model. In Section 5, we derive an optimal monetary policy and show the properties of this optimal monetary policy. In Section 6, we derive optimal macroprudential policy for …nancial stability under various settings and reveal the interaction between the optimal macroprudential and the optimal monetary policy. In Section 7, we conclude the paper. icant in ‡uence on business cycle dynamics. In the BGG model, this …nancial market wedge is determined by time-varying leverage, in that endogenous mechanisms in credit markets work to amplify and propagate shocks to the economy. In Bianchi (2010) , the …nancial market friction is introduced by externalities in which private agents undervalue the dynamics of net worth since the agents fail to internalize spillover e¤ect among them.
The Model

Household
A representative household in our model enters the goods market to consume C t in real terms with price P t , and receives t as a lump-sum pro…t from wholesale …rms and a bank in real terms. In addition, the household deposits D t in its bank account at the beginning of time t, and receives the deposit back with the nominal interest rate R D t at the end of time t.
Assuming that the utility of the household depends only on the consumption C t , the household's problem is expressed as
subject to the budget constraint
We assume the following utility function.
where is a coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion of the household.
This optimization problem leads to
where t is the Lagrangian multiplier in the household's optimization problem.
It is assumed that the consumption C t consists of goods labeled by j 2 [0; 1]. The consumption of each good c t (j) is related to the total consumption C t by
where " t 2 (1; 1) is an exogenous stochastic variable related to the elasticity of substitution. The households choose the level of consumption of each good c t (j) in order to minimize the cost R 1 0 p t (j)c t (j)dj, given the level of total consumption C t and the price of each good p t (j). This minimization yields
where
Wholesale Firms
Each …rm seeks for a credit line in the credit market at time t if the …rm is a credit seeker.
The number of credit seekers is u t , the total number of credit lines is L t , and the amount of each credit line in real terms is a. If a …rm has a credit contract at time t 1 but fails to receive an update on the credit line with the probability at time t, the …rm becomes a credit seeker. On the other hand, if a …rm does not have a credit contract at time t 1, it automatically becomes a credit seeker at time t. Under this setting, the number of credit seekers at time t is obtained by
Credit seeking …rms participate in the bargaining of credit lines with a representative bank.
As a result of the matching process, L t (the number of credit lines at time t) is related to
where p F t is the probability of getting a credit line for each credit seeking …rm. When a …rm has a credit line, the …rm uses the amount of credit a to buy retail goods a(j), which are then used as an input or a sweat cost to produce wholesale goods with productivity Z. A …rm's gain when it has a credit line is then
where R L t 1 is the real interest rate for the credit, t Pt P w t is the price markup by retail …rms, and P w t is the price of a wholesale good. The …rst two terms show the net pro…t from production at time t and the third term is the discounted present value of the future pro…t. On the other hand, a …rm's gain when it fails to receive a credit line is
Since the …rm cannot obtain a credit line, it does not produce at time t and it only has the discounted future values. These equations imply that the gain from a credit line for a credit seeking …rm is
Bank
A representative bank decides on the number of credit vacancies v t to post in order to maximize its pro…t B t with respect to
subject to
where is a cost for posting each credit vacancy and q B t is the vacancy …lling rate. In reality, includes the cost of collecting borrowers' information and examining the loan applications. This maximization problem yields
The bank's expected gain from one credit line should be, with free entry, the same as the cost of a vacancy post. This condition implies that the bank's gain for a credit line is
We assume that the cost of posting credit vacancies v t is again paid by consumption of retail goods v t (j), in a similar way as the household consumption C t and the …rms'input for production a. Therefore, the demand for good j and the total demand are given by
and
respectively, where
Retail Firms
A retail …rm producing goods j faces the demand given by the equation (8), and it has to pay P w t to buy wholesale goods as an input to produce the …nal goods. In order to introduce the price stickiness, it is assumed that a …rm can adjust its price each period with probability 1 ! as in the model by Calvo (1983) . The pro…t maximization problem of a retail …rm when it has a chance to adjust its price P t becomes
where the demand equation (8) is used. We here assume that the subsidy for …rms is set to ensure that the price ‡exibility is achieved at the e¢ cient steady-state equilibrium discussed below. Note that the average price level P t is given by
Loan Market Matching
The number of new credit matches is
in a Cob-Douglas form where (0 < < 1) is a substitution for u t and v t , and is a constant parameter for matching. To make the calculation clearer, we use the credit market tightness
so that
In the loan market, the total gain from loan extension is the sum of credit seeking …rms' gain f t and the bank's gain J t as follows
where b is the bargaining power of credit seeking …rms. This is an asymmetric Nash bargaining condition. By taking the …rst order condition with respect to R L t ,
For convenience, we simplify the equations (5) and (6) by using the equations (10), (11), (13) , and (7) to eliminate p F t , q B t , f t , and J t , yielding
respectively. If we further eliminate R L t from these equations, we obtain the following condition that relates to the markup t to the credit market tightness t :
Market Clearing Condition
Since one unit of the wholesale goods is needed as an input to produce one unit of each retail goods j, the market clearing condition for the wholesale goods is
Together with the demand equation for the retail goods (8), the following market clearing condition is obtained:
represents the dispersion of the prices of retail goods due to the price stickiness for retail …rms.
3 Welfare Criteria
E¢ cient Steady-State Equilibrium
The second order expansion of the household's utility function is set around the e¢ cient steady-state equilibrium, which is the equilibrium designed by a social planner without credit matching ine¢ ciency or price dispersion. Such a situation can only be achieved (1) when the Hosios condition b = 1 for the bargaining power of …rm b and the matching share is satis…ed and (2) when the subsidy for retail …rms is chosen to make sure
Under these assumptions, the optimization problem for the social planner is expressed as max C;L;u;
where t , t , and s t are Lagrangian multipliers for the constraints.
The solution to this optimization problem yields the following condition for the e¢ cient steady-state equilibrium:
which is simpli…ed for convenience as
Note that the bar above each variable (e.g., v) implies the e¢ cient steady-state value of the variable (v t ).
Policy Objective Function
The second order expansion of the household's utility function around the e¢ cient steady state yields
where b c t is the log-deviation of C t from the e¢ cient steady-state value C. The goal of the following calculation in this subsection is to express this utility u(C t ) by only b l t , b l t 1 , and the in ‡ation rate t b p t b p t 1 . This calculation closely follows the derivation of a policy objective function by Ravenna and Walsh (2011) for the search and matching in the labor market. By using the market clearing condition of the equation (15),
Note that the e¢ cient steady-state value of the price dispersion term Q t is Q = 1, and the log-deviation of this term b q t is already in the second order, as is shown below.
Using the equation (9)
and the equation (4)
Then, we obtain up to the second order
By using this equation and the equation (12), we can eliminate b t and get
Thus, the utility of the equation (1) is rewritten as
By using the e¢ cient steady-state condition given by the equation (17), the two terms on the right-hand side of the equation above are shown to depend only on b l t 1 , and the utility
where t:i:p: denotes "terms independent of policy."
Next, we consider the sum over the price dispersion terms b q t+i . By the de…nition of the equation (16),
Since the de…nition of the aggregate price P t given by the equation (3) can be used to show that
Up to the second order in b p t , we can thus rewrite b q t as
On the other hand, the equation to obtain V t is written as
Here, we remember that only the fraction 1 ! of all …rms adjust their prices to P t , while other …rms do not change their prices p t 1 (j). b p t , the log-deviation of P t , can in turn be expressed by b p t and b p t 1 . Hence,
up to the second order again in b p t . Using the in ‡ation rate t b p t b p t 1 , we thus have
The sum of V t becomes
We therefore obtain (20) and (21),
We also use the approximations up to the second order
and …nally, we have the following second order expansion of the household's utility function
We note that, even if we introduce exogenous productivity shock Z t in the model, we can derive a mathematically-similar formula for the utility by taking the di¤erence from the e¢ cient stochastic state. This point is discussed in the appendix.
The optimal policy faces the trade-o¤ among the in ‡ation rate, consumption, and credit market tightness. The credit market tightness is a new feature for the optimal policy under the loan market friction. Moreover, the approximated welfare function can be transformed
Thus, the optimal policy should respond to the changes in credit. This result theoretically supports the papers of Quint and Rabanal (2011), Suh (2012) , and Kannan, Rabanal, and Scott (2012), claiming in numerical simulations that the policy should respond to the changes in credit, in addition to the in ‡ation rate and the output gap.
Analysis for Welfare Criteria
In this section, we analyze the dependence of the welfare function on di¤erent parameters, especially focusing on the weight of the term corresponding to the …nancial friction.
To start the analysis, we …x the parameter values as shown in Table 1 . We assume that each period corresponds to one quarter, and set the discount factor = 0:99 and the probability of the price adjustment for retail …rms as 1 ! = 0:2. As for the other parameters, since our objective is not to calibrate the model but to illustrate the important characteristics of the …nancial frictions in our model, the set of the parameter values in Table 1 is to be taken as just one example, and it is con…rmed that the qualitative conclusion in this section apply to a wide range of parameter values.
As shown in Figure 1 , as the cost for posting each credit vacancy increases, the relative weight for credit to that for the consumption in the approximated welfare function ( = c of the equation (22)) increases. 5 This is because the wedge of the …nancial market friction increases when increases since, as shown in the equation (15), it is related with the resource of economy used to match the loan v.
The same result holds for , the probability of failing to receive an update on the credit line. When increases, = c increases as shown in Figure 2 . 6 This is also because the 5 The other parameters adopted in the Figure 1 are given by Table 1 . Note that, when the cost for posting each credit vacancy changes, the steady-state values of the variables v and C shifts to satisfy the e¢ cient steady-state equilibrium condition as shown in the equation (17) . 6 The other parameters adopted in the Figure 2 are given by Table 1 . Note that the variation of also increase of raises the cost of holding the credit.
These results imply that the relative weight for the credit term increases when the degree of ine¢ ciency to hold credit increases. In other words, as the degree of market imperfection increases, the optimal monetary policy should take a credit market condition into account more seriously.
Linearization
We show the closed linearized system of the economy around the e¢ cient equilibrium.
For general stochastic non-e¢ cient state, the Calvo-type stickiness introduced in the retail sector leads to the standard Phillips curve with a cost-push shock b " t as t = E t t+1
The retail price markup term b t in this equation can be obtained by the linearized equation (14),
The IS relation is given by
We call b c t as the output gap.
The credit market tightness is given by
The relation between consumption and credit is given by
a¤ects the steady-state values of the variables v and C It is also noteworthy that the log-linearized deviation of the loan interest rate b r L t is related to the credit market tightness b t and the deposit interest rate b r D t by the following equation:
The credit market tightness and the real deposit rate determine the loan interest rate. This
Thus, the loan interest rate and credit have a close relation. By using the equation ( 
Optimal Monetary Policy
We assume that a central bank control the nominal interest rate on deposits to maximize the social welfare, following Woodford (2003) . The optimal precommitment policy rule for the central bank under the timeless perspective should therefore be obtained by solving the following minimization problem:
subject to the Phillips curve of equation (23), the markup of equation (24), the IS relation of equation (25), and the expressions for the credit market tightness of equation (26), and the consumption of equation (27).
Then, the optimal monetary policy, which is the nominal interest rate, is given by the …rst order conditions for t , b t , b c t , b l t , and b r D t , respectively as:
where ' 1t , ' 2t , ' 3t , and ' 4t are Lagrangian multipliers for the Phillips curve of the equation (23), the IS relation of the equation (25), and the expressions for the credit market tightness of the equation (26), and the consumption of the equation (27), respectively.
6 Optimal Macroprudential Policy
Intervention for Nash Bargaining
We introduce a macroprudential policy that intervenes in the setting of the loan interest rate between a …rm and a bank through Nash bargaining. The monetary authority control the parameter b of Nash bargaining as
where b t is the policy variable of the monetary authority. In reality, the monetary authority controls the degree of competition in the loan market by changing a …nancial regulations on banks'competition. In this case, the retail price markup term b t in the equation (24) changes as
The welfare function and other parts of the model, however, do not change. Then, the optimal policy measure for …nancial stability is given by
Accompanied with the optimal monetary policy, under the optimal macroprudential policy, the in ‡ation rate is …xed to zero, and other variables are also zero against the costpush shock. This is because …nancial stability leads to price stability via the cost channel.
This case shows that the macroprudential policy for …nancial stability can hold a close relation with price stability and ultimately with the monetary policy.
Intervention for Credit Separation
Another way to intervene in the credit market could be limiting or controlling the credit separation rate . 7 In this macroprudential policy, the monetary authority controls the total volume of credit. If the change in a¤ects no other exogenous parameters, it can be shown in our model that the utility is maximized by always setting to zero. In the real economy, however, constraining natural separation of credit between banks and …rms result in a deterioration of productivity. 8 To allow the policy makers to control the separation rate t , we introduce the following phenomenological relation between the average productivity of wholesale …rms Z t and the separation rate t :
where f is a monotonically-increasing concave function. We then assume that the expansion of the above relation up to the second order from a steady-state value can be expressed as 7 We can also make the credit vacancies or the matching parameter as policy variables. 8 A similar feature for the separation between workers and …rms is endogenously captured by the matching model by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) .
where the …rst and the second derivative of the function f under the e¢ cient steady-state equilibrium satisfy f 1 > 0 and f 2 0, respectively.
In addition to the equation (17), the e¢ cient steady-state condition becomes,
where can be nonzero. In this case, the welfare function becomes
where u c L 2 jf 2 j and u c L f 1 . See the appendix for the details of the calculation.
The implication of this equation is clear. The fact that the last term is linear in b
suggests that, when the number of credit increases, the society is better o¤ by setting the separation rate higher than the e¢ cient equilibrium value and so by reducing credit.
The second-order term b 2 t+i is then the cost incurred by excessive control of b from the concavity of the function f . When the probability of failing to receive an update on the credit line increases, the relative weigth for the terms of the separation rate increase. This is because increase of raise the cost of holding the credit.
The time-variation in the separation rate modi…es the relation between the credit tightness and the number of credit as
In addition, the markup equation is modi…ed as
On the other hand, the e¢ cient steady-state condition (35) ensures that the equation (27) between consumption and credit is unchanged up to the …rst order.
The optimal policy is obtained by maximizing the above utility subject to the Phillips curve of the equation (23), the modi…ed markup of the equation (38), the IS relation of the equation (25), and the expressions for the credit market tightness of the equation (37), and the consumption of the equation (27). This maximization replaces one of the …rst order conditions (32) by
In addition, the following …rst order condition for b t is obtained:
or by using the equations (29) and (33),
The optimal macroprudential policy adjusts the separation rate by taking account of the trade-o¤ among the separation rate, credit market tightness, consumption, and the in ‡ation rate, while all of the separation rate, credit market tightness, and consumption are closely related to the amount of credit b l t by the equations (27) and (37). In fact, we can explicitly derive the following macroprudential policy by substituting the equations (31) and (41) into the equation (39) to eliminate ' 3t and ' 4t :
Note that the equation (27) is used to eliminate b c t . The form of the equation (42) clearly suggests that the optimal choice of the separation rate is determined by the in ‡ation rate and the increase in the credit " t + b l t b l t 1 . The monetary authority should pay attention to the in ‡ation in addition to the credit since …nancial market and real economy are tightly connected. Thus, for both the monetary authority and the central bank, it is essential to internalize another policy each other.
Concluding Remarks
We introduce the search and matching type of friction into the loan market in a standard New Keynesian model. In this model, the second order approximation of social welfare includes the term relating to credit, such as credit market tightness, the volume of credit, and a loan separation rate, in addition to the in ‡ation rate and the output gap. This is a new …nding in a …eld of the optimal policy. The outcome of the optimal policy changes in accordance with the type of macroprudential policy for …nancial stability.
For the future research, the following points could be of interest. The model considered in this paper is restricted to the case where the central bank and monetary authority coordinate their policy choices so as to maximize social welfare. An alternative assumption would be that two policy makers set their respective policies in a non-cooperative way.
Moreover, we can assume a situation where the macroprudential policy can have impact on disturbances, even though the monetary policy cannot a¤ect them. They can be disturbances from credit spreads on the policy interest rate. Another issue is a question for what kinds of policies are simple and implementable to replicate the optimal policy measure for …nancial stability, is as in the case with the Taylor rule in the optimal monetary policy analysis. In such an analysis, it would be interesting to quantitatively evaluate priority among stabilization of credit, the in ‡ation rate, and the output gap. 
The policy objective function can be divided as
is the collection of the terms that include b z t , and
represents the other terms. By using the equation (44) only for the last term in A t , On the other hand, the equation (14) implies that, at the e¢ cient stochastic equilibrium, we have
By substituting this, A t can be further simpli…ed as
b l t+i + t:i:p:
,
is used. The two terms in the …rst summation on the right-hand side are again t:i:p:, and the last summation can be rewritten as
We thus obtain
This expression for A t is substituted into the policy objective function of equation (45),
+ t:i:p:
+ t:i:p: We therefore con…rm that the form of the utility-based policy objective function remains the same even when we introduce the productivity shock. In addition, we can easily see that all the relevant structural equations (23, 24, 25, 26, and 27) can be written identically if we replace b x by e x for all the variables X t .
B Policy Objective Function with Time-Dependent Separation Rate
In this section, we show the derivation of the equations (35) and (36).
The e¢ cient steady-state condition is obtained by the following maximization problem: max C;L;u; ;
By taking the …rst-order conditions for the …ve variables and rearranging the equations, we obtain
At the e¢ cient steady-state equilibrium, the former condition becomes identical to the equation (17) , while the latter can be rearranged to the condition (35).
We note that the latter equation, when linearized around the e¢ cient steady-state equilibrium, is written as
and could be obtained from the optimal policy in the main text, if there were no in ‡ation.
This point can be easily con…rmed by substituting the equation (30) into the equation (40) to eliminate ' 3t and by remembering that ' 1t is zero without in ‡ation from the equation (29).
As for the second-order expansion of the utility, both the time-dependence of the separation rate t and the productivity Z t make the calculation slightly complicated, although the basic procedure of the derivation is straightforward. For example, the productivity enters the expansion of consumption, and the equation corresponding to the equation (18) becomes:
On the other hand, the expansion of the credit vacancy (19) is modi…ed by the timedependence of the separation rate as:
After eliminating the credit market tightness b t by using
we obtain the following expansion of the utility:
At this stage, by using the equations (34) and (35), we observe that the …rst-order di¤erence between b z t and b t is cancelled, and we …nally obtain the equation (36).
